Again, I would not count reproduction as a physiological need of the individual. It is a need of the species that is to blame for a physiological drive towards sexual stimulation, though. Maslow's works also appear to treat the physiological need for sex as one for sexual stimulation and not reproduction, though he also makes clear that satisfying that need usually involves satisfying higher needs for love and intimacy as well.
He has some interesting points that kinda relate to chastity though:
Certainly, if we may speak of the needs for rest and sleep, we may therefore also speak of their frustration and its effects (sleepiness, fatigue, lack of energy, loginess, perhaps even laziness, lethargy, etc.), and gratification (alertness, vigor, zest, etc.). Here are immediate consequences of simple need gratification which, if they be not accepted character traits, are at least of definite interest to the student of personality. And while we are not accustomed yet to thinking so, the same can be said for the sex need, e.g., the category sex-obsessed and the contrasting one of sex-gratification for which we have as yet no respectable vocabulary.
An ever-recurring question is: Does sexual deprivation inevitably give rise to all or any of the many effects of frustration, e.g., aggression, sublimation, etc.? It is now well known that many cases are found in which celibacy has no psychopathological effects. In many other cases, however, it has inaiìy bad effects. What factor determines which shall be the result? Clinical work with nonneurotic people gives the clear answer that sexual deprivation becomes pathogenic in a severe sense only when it is felt by the individual to represent rejection by the opposite sex, inferiority, lack of worth, lack of respect, isolation, or other thwarting of basic needs. Sexual deprivation can be borne with relative ease by individuals for whom it has no such implications (of course, there will probably be what Rosenzweig (408) calls need-persistive reactions, but these, though irritating, are not necessarily pathological).
The unavoidable deprivations in childhood are also ordinarily thoughtof as frustrating. Weaning, elimination control, learning to walk, in fact every new level of adjustment, is conceived to be achieved by forcible pushing of the child. Here, too, the differentiation between mere deprivation and threat to the personality enjoins caution upon us. Observations of children, who are completely assured of the love and respect of their parents have shown that deprivations, disciplines, and punishments can sometimes be borne with astonishing ease. There are few frustration effects if these deprivations are not conceived by the child to be threatening to his fundamental personality, to his main life goals, or needs.
From this point of view, it follows that the phenomenon of threatening frustration is much more closely allied to other threat situations than it is to mere deprivation. The classic effects of frustration are also found frequently to be a consequence of other types of threat-traumatization, conflict, cortical damage, severe illness, actual physical threat, imminence of death, humiliation, or great pain.
This leads us to our final hypothesis that perhaps frustration as a single concept is less useful than the two concepts that crosscut it: (I) deprivation of nonbasic needs and (2) threat to the personality, i.e., to the basic needs or to the various coping systems associated with them. Deprivation implies much less than is ordinarily implied by the concept of frustration; threat implies much more. Deprivation is not psychopathogenic; threat is.
And yet there are several meanings of self-control, or of inhibition, and some of them are quite desirable and healthy, even apart from what is necessary for dealing with the outside world. Control need not mean frustration or renunciation of basic need gratifications. What I would call the "Apollonizing controls" do not call the gratification of needs into question at all; they make them more rather than less enjoyable by, e.g., suitable delay (as in sex), by gracefulness (as in dancing or swimming) by estheticizing (as with food and drink), by stylizing (as in sonnets), by ceremonializing, sacralizing, dignifying, by doing something well rather than just doing it.
For one thing it can be reported that sex and love can be and most often are more perfectly fused with each other in healthy people. Although it is perfectly true that these are separable concepts, and although no purpose would be served in confusing them with each other unnecessarily, still it must be reported that in the life of healthy people, they tend to become joined and merged with each other. As a matter of fact we may also say that they become less separable and less separate from each other in the lives of the people we have studied. We cannot go so far as some who say that any person who is capable of having sexual pleasure where there is no love must be a sick man. But we can certainly go in this direction. It is certainly fair to say that self-actualizing men and women tend on the whole not to seek sex for its own sake, or to be satisfied with it alone when it comes. I am not sure that my data permit me to say that they would rather not have sex at all if it came without affection, but I am quite sure that I have a fair number of instances in which for the time being at least sex was given up or rejected because it came without love or affection.
Sex is customarily discussed as if it were a problem of avoiding the plague. The preoccupation with the dangers of sex has obscured the obvious that it can be or should be a very enjoyable pastime and possibly also a very profoundly therapeutic and educational one.